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Abstract
We propose a generalization of the quantum hashing technique based
on the notion of the small-bias sets. These sets have proved useful in dif-
ferent areas of computer science, and here their properties give an optimal
construction for succinct quantum presentation of elements of any finite
abelian group, which can be used in various computational and crypto-
graphic scenarios. The known quantum fingerprinting schemas turn out
to be the special cases of the proposed quantum hashing for the corre-
sponding abelian group.
1 Introduction
Hashing is a necessary tool in a bag of tricks of every computer scientist. This
term is believed to be more than 60 years old and during its long history it has
had a variety of useful applications, which include cryptographic protocols, fast
search, and data integrity check.
Recently, we have proposed a quantum version of this technique [1], which
can also be useful in similar scenarios. For instance, it is a suitable quantum
one-way function that can be used in the quantum digital signature protocol by
Gottesman and Chuang [2]. It can also be used in different quantum computa-
tional models as a basis for efficient algorithms [3] and communication protocols
[4].
The classical hashing is deeply connected with error-correcting codes, i.e.
as shown by Stinson [5] they can be built from each other. The special case
of error-correcting codes called ε-balanced codes is related to another impor-
tant combinatorial object known as ε-biased sets [6], which have applications in
different areas of theoretical computer science, such as derandomization, graph
theory, number theory, etc. There are several known explicit constructions of
ε-balanced error-correcting codes [6], [7], [8] that give rise to corresponding
ε-biased sets.
In this paper we show that ε-biased sets can be used to construct quantum
hash functions that have all the necessary cryptographic properties.
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2 Preliminaries
The construction of quantum hashing in this paper relies on the notion of the
ε-biased sets. We use the definition given in [9].
Let G be a finite abelian group and let χa be the characters of G, indexed
by a ∈ G.
Definition 2.1 A set S ⊆ G is called ε-biased, if for any nontrivial character
χa
1
|S|
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈S
χa(x)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
It follows from the Alon-Roichman theorem [10] that a set S of O(log |G|/ε2)
elements selected uniformly at random from G is ε-biased with high probability.
The paper [9] gives explicit constructions of such sets thus derandomizing the
Alon-Roichman theorem.
3 Quantum Hashing
Let G be a finite abelian group with characters χa, indexed by a ∈ G. Let
S ⊆ G be an ε-biased set for some ε ∈ (0, 1).
Definition 3.1 We define a quantum hash function ψS : G → (H
2)⊗ log |S| as
following:
|ψS(a)〉 =
1√
|S|
∑
x∈S
χa(x)|x〉.
The above function given an element a ∈ G creates its quantum hash, which
is a quantum state of log |S| qubits. As mentioned earlier S can be of order
O(log |G|/ε2), and thus quantum hashing transforms its inputs into exponen-
tially smaller outputs. That is, for any a ∈ G represented by log |G| bits the
number of qubits in its quantum hash would be logS = O(log log |G| − log ε).
The cryptographic properties of the hashing from Definition 3.1 are entirely
determined by the ε-biased set S ⊆ G.
In particular all pairwise inner products of different hash codes (which is
also the measure of collision resistance [1]) are bounded by ε by the following
Lemma.
Lemma 3.1
|〈ψS(a1) |ψS(a2)〉| =
1
|S|
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈S
χ∗a1(x)χa2(x)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε,
whenever a1 6= a2.
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Proof. Let χa1(x), χa2(x) be two different characters of G. Then χ
∗
a1
(x) is also
a character of G, and so is the following function χ(x) = χ∗a1(x)χa2(x).
χ(x) is nontrivial character ofG, since χa1(x) 6≡ χa2(x) and χ(x) = χ
∗
a1
(x)χa2 (x) 6≡
χ∗a1(x)χa1 (x) ≡ 1, where 1 is a trivial character of G.
Thus, Lemma follows from the definition of an ε-biased set
|〈ψS(a1) |ψS(a2)〉| =
1
|S|
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈S
χ∗a1(x)χa2(x)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
1
|S|
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈S
χ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.

Irreversibility of ψS is proved via the Holevo theorem and the fact that a
quantum hash is exponentially smaller than its preimage.
The size of the quantum hash above is asymptotically optimal because of the
known lower bound by Buhrman et al. [11] for the size of the sets of pairwise-
distinguishable states: to construct a set of 2k quantum states with pairwise
inner products below ε one will need at least Ω(log(k/ε)) qubits. This implies
the lower bound on the size of quantum hash of Ω(log log |G| − log ε).
In the next sections we give a more detailed look on the quantum hashing
for specific finite abelian groups. In particular, we are interested in hashing
binary strings and thus it is natural to consider G = Zn2 and G = Z2n (or, more
generally, any cyclic group Zq).
3.1 Hashing the Elements of the Boolean Cube
For G = Zn2 its characters can be written in the form χa(x) = (−1)
(a,x), and
quantum hash function is the following
|ψS(a)〉 =
1√
|S|
∑
x∈S
(−1)(a,x)|x〉.
The resulting hash function is exactly the quantum fingerprinting by Buhrman
et al. [11], once we consider an error-correcting code, whose matrix is built from
the elements of S. Indeed, as stated in [8] an ε-balanced error-correcting code
can be constructed out of an ε-biased set. Thus, the inner product (a, x) in the
exponent is equivalent to the corresponding bit of the codeword, and altogether
this gives the quantum fingerprinting function, that stores information in the
phase of quantum states [12].
3.2 Hashing the Elements of the Cyclic Group
For G = Zq χa(x) = e
2piiax
q , and quantum hash function is given by
|ψS(a)〉 =
1√
|S|
∑
x∈S
e
2piiax
q |x〉.
The above quantum hash function is essentially equivalent to the one we have
defined earlier in [1].
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